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Abstract—Several reports indicate that the highest business
priorities include: business improvement, security, and IT man-
agement. The importance of security and risk management is
gaining that even government statements in some cases have
imposed the inclusion of security and risk management within
business management. Risk assessment has become an essential
mechanism for business security analysts, since it allows the
identification and evaluation of any threats, vulnerabilities, and
risks to which organizations maybe be exposed. In this work, a
framework based on the concepts of Model-Driven Development
has been proposed. The framework provides different stages
which range from a high abstraction level to an executable level.
The main contribution lie in the presentation of an extension of
a business process meta-model which includes risk information
based on standard approaches. The meta-model provides neces-
sary characteristics for the risk assessment of business process
models at an abstract level of the approach. The framework has
been equipped with specific stages for the automatic validation of
business processes using model-based diagnosis which permits the
detection of the non-conformance of security objectives specified.
The validation stages ensure that business processes are correct
with regard to the objectives specified by the customer before
they are transformed into executable processes.
Index Terms—business process; risk management; risk assess-
ment; security requirement; conformance
I. INTRODUCTION
Over recent years, a new paradigm has emerged within the
scope of business IT: Business Process Management (BPM).
BPM is defined as a set of concepts, methods, and techniques
to support the modelling, design, administration, configuration,
enactment, and analysis of business processes [1]. BPM has
turned into an essential tool for organizations. BPM aims at
narrowing the gap between business processes that a company
performs and the implementation of these processes in Busi-
ness Process Management Systems (BPMS).
The cost and consequences of security failures and of the
materialization of a threat in these systems range from mildly
annoying to catastrophic, since they can result in serious injury
and lives lost, systems destroyed, security breaches, and so on.
Gartner’s CIO report [2] indicates that the most important
business priorities include: improving business, security and
IT management. Likewise, security and risk management is
gaining and ever more role in the government statements, in
such a way that certain regulations and laws now impose the
inclusion of risk and security management within business
management, such as the Spanish National Security Scheme
[3] and recommendations of the European Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency [4]. Risk assessment, (hence referred
to as RA), has become a crucial mechanism for business
security analysts, since risk assessment is a procedure which
allows the identification and evaluation of any threats, vulner-
abilities, and risks to which organizations may be exposed,
therefore it also enables stakeholders to select the treatment
or countermeasures in order to mitigate, reduce, control, or
transfer the risks identified in the RA.
In this work, a framework is proposed based on the con-
cepts of Model-Driven Development. The framework provides
several stages of modelling, ranging from a high abstraction
level to an executable level. The main effort is focused on the
abstract level where an extension of business process models
which includes risk information is presented. Likewise, various
diagnosis stages are incorporated into the framework in order
to validate the models.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section II a introduc-
tion of the framework is given; in Section III a description of
the diagnosis stage is presented; in Section IV an extension
of business process modes with risk is detailed; Section V
introduces an example; in Section VI a comparison of related
work is presented and finally in Section VII conclusion are
drawn and ongoing work is described.
II. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
The proposed framework is developed based on Model-
Driven Development (MDD) [5] and Model-Driven Architec-
ture (MDA). MDD is a software engineering approach where
models become the key elements in software development,
while MDA is a particular vision of the concepts MDD
provided by the OMG. One of the main goals of MDA is
the improvement of the software adaptation to several dif-
ferent technological scenarios, thereby providing a structural
separation in the architecture at different abstraction levels of
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Fig. 1. Framework overview of the different stages of modelling.
modelling. This separation enables the specification of models
at a very high level through a Platform Independent Meta-
Model (PIM) for a particular domain but with only non-
specific information about the platform where the model will
be deployed. MDA introduces the concept of transformation
which allows the conversion of abstract models into models of
a more specific nature specified by a Platform Specific Meta-
Model (PSM). The main benefit of using MDA comes from the
transformation between models at different abstraction levels,
which allows executable code to be obtained automatically
from abstract models by applying successive transformations.
However, transformations are a conflictive point of the archi-
tecture since if a model is not validated at one level, when
this same model is then transformed into another model, non-
conformance properties could be introduced along with the
different models. Hence, it is crucial to validate the models
before transformations are executed. MDA does not provide
any diagnosis stage as an integrated part of the architecture,
although this idea has already presented in other studies [6]
where the MDA architecture is extended with diagnosis points
before model transformations.
The framework is structured in at least three stages, as
shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, PIM models are built,
then a the first transformation between a PIM model to PSM
models is proposed. In this transformation, extra information
is introduced in terms of information of a more specific
nature information on mechanisms to control or mitigate
security problems. Therefore, PSM models are PIM models
enriched with specific information. Although other interme-
diate transformations can be introduced between PSM and
other PSM models, as a first approach, a transformation from
PSM models to final code is proposed. A particular diagnosis
stage is introduced for the validation of models before each
transformation.
We propose the utilization of business process models based
on BPMN by the OMG [7] as the PIM of the framework.
Business process models are only a graphical representation
of a set of tasks and control flows that define the structure
of a business process. Nowadays, at the design level business
process models gather no information for instance about how
the tasks are executed or which platform is used. Although,
these models are abstract, they still need an evaluation and
validation of their security and risks. To this end, an extension
of BPMN models the inclusion of risk information is provided
Fig. 2. Diagnosis process of checking conformance.
in order to focus on security issues so that the risk assessment
of business processes can be performed. Moreover, a model-
based diagnosis has been incorporated into the different diag-
nosis stages in order to determine the non-conformance of the
security properties of business processes.
Therefore, this paper is focused on presenting the extension
of business process models to include risk information, as a
PIM Meta-Model, and on introducing the first diagnosis stage.
III. DIAGNOSIS OF NON-CONFORMANCE OF SECURITY
OBJECTIVES
Model-based diagnosis is included in the diagnosis stages in
order to perform a the risk assessment of business processes
and to identify any non-conformance of security objectives
at the acceptable levels. As defined in the ISO/IEC 27002,
”the risk assessment will help to guide and determine the
appropriate management action and priorities for managing
information security risks, and for implementing controls
selected to protect against these risks.” Therefore, a risk
assessment process is an obligatory step towards determining
whether the risks must be managed.
The diagnosis of non-conformance implies three tasks:
detection, identification and isolation. Detection is used to find
the existence of the non-conformance of objectives, and the
identification and isolation permit the elements involved in the
non-conformance to be located. In this way, the application
of constraint programming [8] is considered as a solution
for the automation of the diagnosis stage. To this end, a
transformation is attempted from the business process models
enriched with risk information into a Constraint Satisfaction
Problem (CSP). This CSP model can be automatically solved
using a solver tool (a solver is a engine of constraints that
implements some algorithms in order to solve CSPs). The
solver can retrieve information on whether the model conform
to the acceptable values specified and is also able to provide
information to identify and isolate where and what fails to
conform to. The complete diagnosis process is depicted in
Figure 2. In Section V an example of the detection of non-
conformance is detailed.
Fig. 3. Business process meta-model extension with risk information.
IV. EXTENDING BUSINESS PROCESS MODELS WITH RISK
INFORMATION
An extension of the BPMN meta-model is defined, see
Figure 3. The extension is mainly based on the UML profile of
Quality of Service (QoS) and Fault Tolerance (FT) Character-
istics and Mechanisms Specification, [9]. This profile defines
a generic catalogue of QoS characteristics and categories.
These characteristics and categories are the constructors for
the description of non-functional aspects such as latency,
security, and integrity. Our approach is contained within the
QoS category of Security that covers various subjects, such as
the protection of entities and access to resources. The profile
also provides a set of generic concepts in order to develop risk
assessment capabilities within IT systems.
Before continuing, an introduction is required of the set
of concepts from the UML profile which are used to in the
definition of the extension of the meta-model:
• Assets are the elements (participants, tasks, business
processes, etc.) that contribute value to the organization.
• Vulnerabilities can be defined as those faults linked to an
asset that could compromise the correct operation of the
asset or compromise the information that is used for the
asset. In our context, faults are considered as the non-
conformance with regard to the specification.
• Threats are situations or actions that can occur to the
assets which may cause damage to the organization.
• Countermeasures are the appropriate measures which
help towards a reduction of the impact of a threat to the
organization.
• Treatment is a specific countermeasures that the organi-
zation uses to reduce the effects of a threat
A. Modelling the evaluation of assets
Assets could be considered as the pools, tasks, resources
and data that use the business processes. We have assumed
that a pool is an individual business process which gathers
information relative to the participants, tasks, data objects, and
flows. Therefore, a business process is the main asset to be
assessed.
The profile [9] introduces the concept of Asset Value to the
qualification of assets. This attribute indicates an estimation
about the importance of a business process. Furthermore, the
asset value is separated into three sub-categories in accordance
Fig. 4. Business process extended with new parameters.
with ISO/IEC 27004, and related to security issues: Value
integrity, Value confidentiality, and Value availability. The
qualification of the individual tasks is also permitted within
the business process. In the asset assessment task two types
of measurement are usually applied: qualitative (verbal scale
of values) and quantitative (interval of numerical values). A
qualification based on an interval of values from 1 (worst
value) to 5 (best value) is adopted in our approach. This
interval of values is the same as that used by the CRAMM
methodology, although other intervals of values can be used,
since the profile restricts none of these attributes. An example
where activities are qualified can be observed in Figure 4 .
AssetV alue = V alue Integrity +
V alue Confidentiality + V alue Availability;
Information relative to the goals of the business process
is considered. In this way, the Objective concept defined by
the Business Motivation Model [10] is adopted. Objectives
permit the constraints to express what the customer needs with
respect to the business process. Objectives are modelled by
two parameters Pre and Post, and are indicative of what the
process requires (Pre), and of what the process should ensure
(Post). An example of objectives is shown in Figure 4 where
Post indicates that the total cost associated to the business
process cannot exceed 3000 euros.
Acceptable Risk is another parameter incorporated into the
extension. This parameter indicates how acceptable the risk is
in order to conform with the expected risk of the organization.
Acceptable risk is not included within the profile, but its
inclusion is considered since it permits the specification of
a requirement which indicates that the overall risk of the
business process cannot exceed certain limits. As defined in the
ISO/IEC 31000: ”the risk assessment is a process which helps
to determine if the risks are acceptable”. In the case when the
Fig. 5. Example of a threat scenario.
risk of a business process exceeds the limits, business experts
have to decide whether to transfer, avoid, mitigate, or accept
this risk. Therefore, this parameter can play a crucial role in
the risk assessment process.
Other parameters are included into the business process with
regard to monetary value. The inclusion of cost parameters is
considered as a means to carry out a more realistic analysis.
Only two parameters are included in the extension with respect
to the business process: Fixed cost, and Threshold which
indicate the cost and the interval of allowed monetary values
respectively.
B. Modelling vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are possible causes of non-conformance
which could compromise the correct operation of the assets
or the information that is used for the assets. A list of
vulnerabilities is included in extension, as shown in Figure
4. Vulnerabilities can also be linked to specific tasks or flows
inside the process, although, for the sake of simplicity only
those vulnerabilities that affect the entire business process
are taken into account. Vulnerabilities could be selected from
some of the available catalogues such as the NIST catalogue
[11] and ISO/IEC 27005 - Annex C.
Vulnerabilities are associated with a set of risks concerned
with the likelihood, given a specific situation, of the business
process being compromised or damaged. Risks are attached
into the threat scenarios which are given detailed below
section. Risk must be linked with a specific vulnerability
previously attached to the business process. This is represented
as a relation between Vulnerability and Risk in the meta-model
in the Figure 3.
C. Modelling risks, treatments and threat scenarios
The UML profile [9], introduces the concept of scenarios
attached to assets. These scenarios describe, identify and
document unwanted incidents concerned with exploring the
threats and vulnerabilities of the asset under assessment. In our
case, threat scenarios can be attached to business processes.
Threat scenarios are composed of two sets, the first for risks,
and the second set to specify the countermeasures, as shown
in Figure 5.
A risk represents a factor that indicates the combination of
the probability of an event and its consequence:
• Frequency indicates how often a risk occurs.
• Consequence indicates the possible extent of the risk
incurred by the threat.
Countermeasures is a set of treatments applied in order to
reduce the risks. Each treatment has an associated property
called Risk Reduction which indicates the value of reduction
if the treatment were applied to a specific risk. In addition, a
new property Cost is added to take into account the cost of
implementation of treatment.
It is assumed that treatment could reduce the effects of risk
by the same percentage (frequency and consequence), however
this is false in the majority of cases. For this reason, three types
of treatments are considered one that reduces the frequency;
another that reduces the consequence; and a third that reduces
both these factors. Therefore, two Boolean parameters F and C
are included into the treatments in order to indicate whether
the risk reduction affects frequency or consequence. Hence,
the casuistic is larger, since the selection of treatment could
multiply due to the wide range of solutions available, which
could reduce the frequency, the consequence or both.
V. EXAMPLE OF AN APPLICATION
In this section, an example of the problem of risk assessment
and of the verification of non-conformance is presented using
the extension proposed. The example depicted in Figure 6
represents a business process of patients who try to be admitted
into a medical centre for a medical evaluation. The business
process is evaluated with regard to security issues. Business
security experts have identified a threat scenario with two
risks: Deny of Service (DoS) and Unexpected manipulation
of personal data; and have identified one treatment for Data
Integrity Systems in the form of a Message Authentication
Code (MAC).
There are several ways to calculate these risks, where each
methodology applies its own criteria. An example of the
criteria adopted in this paper is shown in the formula below,
which permits the calculation of the risk value for the Fill out







[Consequencer − (RRt ∗ Consequencer/100)] }
In general, this formula can be used for the calculation
of the risk value of any single task. This calculation is a
tedious and time-consuming task for several reasons, one of
which is the possibility of having to support interval values
for the different parameter of the model. In Figure 6 shows
some parameters that are specified as an interval of values:
RR=[10%-40%], Frequency=[1-3], Consequence=[2-5], and
so on. In this case, the calculation of the risk has to be
carried out while taking into account all possible combination
of values for each parameter. For instance, the FoR risk value
can be calculated as shown below, according the following set
of values: the MAC has a risk reduction of 10%, DoS risk has
(Freq=1 and Conseq=2), and Unexpected theft has (Freq = 3
and Conseq=4).
RiskFoR = [9∗(1−(1∗10/100))∗(2−(2∗10/100))]+
[9 ∗ (3− (3 ∗ 10/100)) ∗ (4− (4 ∗ 10/100))] = 126
Fig. 6. Example of scenario of a business process extended with risk capabilities.
Considering another case, for instance, an increase of the
risk reduction to 30%, the risk value is less than before.
RiskFoR = [9∗(1−(1∗30/100))∗(2−(2∗30/100))]+
[9 ∗ (3− (3 ∗ 30/100)) ∗ (4− (4 ∗ 30/100))] = 63
Considering another case, for instance, where the DoS
frequency is 3, the risk estimation is even higher than the
first estimation.
RiskFoR = [9∗(3−(3∗10/100))∗(2−(2∗10/100))]+
[9 ∗ (3− (3 ∗ 10/100)) ∗ (4− (4 ∗ 10/100))] = 162
Previous risk values are only three examples of risk calcu-
lation for the same task, although there exist more than 100
casuistics that must be considered. Clearly, the problem could
become an exponential problem.





Then, the risk value for the Patient business process is
obtained as follows:
RiskBPPatient = 140 + 160 + 192 = 492
Once the risk value is determined, the conformance can
be checked with regard to the acceptable risk (Acceptable
Risk). A business process that exceeds the specified level of
acceptable risk implies the existence of non-conformance.
∀p ∈ BP → Riskp < AcceptableRiskp
In the case above, the Patient business process display
non-conformance since its risk value exceed the acceptable
levels specified. The result of the diagnosis (detection) of non-
conformance could be shown as follows.
• Business process tasks:
– RiskFoR = 140
– RiskAR = 160
– RiskRME = 192
• Risks:
– DoS (Communication fault):
∗ Frequency = 4
∗ Consequence = 5
– Unexpected theft or manipulation of personal data:
∗ Frequency = 2
∗ Consequence = 5
• Treatments:
– Data Integrity System (MAC):
∗ Risk Reduction = 30%
• Non-Conformance:
– RiskBPPatient = 492 ≮ 300
On the other hand, the risk value Patient business process
can also lie within the acceptable limits as defined other
casuistic examples, for example:
• Business process tasks:
– RiskFoR = 63
– RiskAR = 70
– RiskRME = 84
• Risks:
– DoS (Communication fault):
∗ Frequency = 1
∗ Consequence = 2
– Unexpected theft or manipulation personal data:
∗ Frequency = 3
∗ Consequence = 4
• Treatments:
– Data Integrity System (MAC):
∗ Risk Reduction = 30%
• Non-Conformance:
– RiskBPPatient = 217 ≮ 300
An exhaustive search for solutions is impossible due to
the enormity of the search space. Therefore, it is necessary
for other mechanisms to determine the set of values for the
parameters that conform to specified levels of acceptable risk.
For this reason, CSP is proposed as the mechanism to solve
this problem since it permits specified variables with open
domains (interval of values) and a function objective (non-
conformance criteria). The CSP solver attempt to find an
assignment of values for the variables in order to satisfy the
objective function whenever is to be possible.
VI. RELATED WORK
A comparative study of several approaches is developed
following the survey presented by [22] as shown in Table
I. The comparison is carried out in accordance with the
following categories: (1) Modelling: indicates which mod-
elling languages are supported; (2) Security issues: indicates
whether the qualification is carried out with regard to security
parameters; (3) Cost: indicates whether costs are considered
for the risk assessment; (4) Objectives: indicates whether
the approach supports the specification of requirements; (5)
Vulnerabilities: indicates whether the approach supports the
specification of vulnerabilities; (6) Countermeasures: indicates
whether the approach supports the specification of Counter-
measures; (6) Diagnosis conformance: indicates whether the
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF BUSINESS PROCESS SECURITY APPROACHES.
Security issues Cost Objectives Vulnerability/Threat Diagnosis non-conformance Countermeasure Modelling
Our approach X X X X X X BPMN
Korherr [12] X X X(Partial) X X X EPC and BPMN
Menzel [13] X X X X X X BPMN
Cope [14] X(Partial) X X X X X BPMN
Muehelen [15] X X(Partial) X X(Partial) X X(Partial) EPC
Lambert [16] X X X X X X IDEF
Rodriguez [17] X X X X X X UML
Neiger [18] X X X X X X EPC
Sackman [19] X X Possible ? X Possible Independent
Jakoubi [20] X X Possible X X Possible Independent
Neubauer [21] X X Possible ? X X Independent
approach supports the diagnosis (detection, identification and
isolation) of the conformance of requirements as specified.
It should be come in mind that the majority of approaches
support some characteristics, however not all of these charac-
teristics are supported together in such a way as we propose
in our extension. Furthermore, no approach supports or fosters
a process for the analysis of the conformance of the require-
ments specified with regard to the risk or security issues as
identified in the model.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a framework separated
into various modelling stages based on the MDD ideas. We
have focused on the PIM stage. The main contribution lies
in the presentation of a meta-model which is an extension
of business process models by including risk information
based on standard approaches. This extension is necessary in
order to carry out a risk assessment of the business process.
Furthermore, the proposed framework is equipped with several
diagnosis stages for the automatic diagnosis of models. In
the first diagnosis stage, we have proposed the application
of a model-based diagnosis using constraint programming
techniques for the automatic verification of conformance by
business processes with security to specified objectives. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first approach
which provides a mechanism to carry out the risk assessment,
and proposes an automatic checking of the conformance of
acceptable risk based on diagnosis techniques. In future work,
we propose extending the framework capabilities to include
new properties in the PIM Meta-Model. Furthermore, we are
also considering the completion of diagnosis by means of
providing identification and isolation mechanisms through the
use of the constraint programming approach.
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